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And so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues are

eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic can with

difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue

of a part only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal

virtue of the whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is

also described as a sort of harmony, and in this respect is akin

to justice. Justice seems to differ from temperance in degree

rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the harmony of

discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by which all

natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the

right place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens.

Justice, again, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues,

and therefore, from Plato's point of view, the foundation of

them, to which they are referred and which in idea precedes them.

The proposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style intended

to avoid monotony.