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As to our not being more apt to do what is noble and just by

reason of possessing Practical Wisdom, we must begin a little

higher up,[51] taking this for our starting-point. As we say that

men may do things in themselves just and yet not be just men; for

instance, when men do what the laws require of them, either

against their will, or by reason of ignorance or something else,

at all events not for the sake of the things themselves; and yet

they do what they ought and all that the good man should do; so

it seems that to be a good man one must do each act in a

particular frame of mind, I mean from Moral Choice and for the

sake of the things themselves which are done. Now it is Virtue

which makes the Moral Choice right, but whatever is naturally

required to carry out that Choice comes under the province not of

Virtue but of a different faculty. We must halt, as it were,

awhile, and speak more clearly on these points.