पृष्ठ 248 / 734

Now the points for our enquiry in respect of Justice and

Injustice are, what kind of actions are their object-matter, and

what kind of a mean state Justice is, and between what points the

abstract principle of it, i.e. the Just, is a mean. And our

enquiry shall be, if you please, conducted in the same method as

we have observed in the foregoing parts of this Treatise.

We see then that all men mean by the term Justice a moral state

such that in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing

what is just, and actually do it, and wish it:[1] similarly also

with respect to Injustice, a moral state such that in consequence

of it men do unjustly and wish what is unjust: let us also be

content then with these as a ground-work sketched out.