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And, upon the following considerations more purely metaphysical,

it will probably appear that the good friend is naturally

choice-worthy to the good man. We have said before, that whatever

is naturally good is also in itself good and pleasant to the good

man; now the fact of living, so far as animals are concerned, is

characterised generally by the power of sentience, in man it is

characterised by that of sentience, or of rationality (the

faculty of course being referred to the actual operation of the

faculty, certainly the main point is the actual operation of it);

so that living seems mainly to consist in the act of sentience or

exerting rationality: now the fact of living is in itself one of

the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a definite

totality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good),

but what is naturally good is good to the good man: for which

reason it seems to be pleasant to all.