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But the real starting point of the enquiry is, whether the two

characters of Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are

distinguished by their object-matter, or their respective

relations to it. I mean, whether the man of Imperfect

Self-Control is such simply by virtue of having such and such

object-matter; or not, but by virtue of his being related to it

in such and such a way, or by virtue of both: next, whether

Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are unlimited in their

object-matter: because he who is designated without any addition

a man of Imperfect Self-Control is not unlimited in his

object-matter, but has exactly the same as the man who has lost

all Self-Control: nor is he so designated because of his relation

to this object-matter merely (for then his character would be

identical with that just mentioned, loss of all Self-Control),

but because of his relation to it being such and such.