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We must enquire again also about Virtue: for it may be divided

into Natural Virtue and Matured, which two bear to each other a

relation similar to that which Practical Wisdom bears to

Cleverness, one not of identity but resemblance.

I speak of Natural Virtue, because men hold that each of the

moral dispositions attach to us all somehow by nature: we have

dispositions[56] towards justice, self-mastery and courage, for

instance, immediately from our birth: but still we seek Goodness

in its highest sense as something distinct from these, and that

these dispositions should attach to us in a somewhat different

fashion.[57] Children and brutes have these natural states, but

then they are plainly hurtful unless combined with an

intellectual element: at least thus much is matter of actual

experience and observation, that as a strong body destitute of

sight must, if set in motion, fall violently because it has not

sight, so it is also in the case we are considering: but if it

can get the intellectual element it then excels in acting. Just

so the Natural State of Virtue, being like this strong body, will

then be Virtue in the highest sense when it too is combined with

the intellectual element.