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But the object of our enquiry is Justice, in the sense in which

it is a part of Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly

say), and likewise with respect to particular Injustice. And of

the existence of this last the following consideration is a

proof: there are many vices by practising which a man acts

unjustly, of course, but does not grasp at more than his share of

good; if, for instance, by reason of cowardice he throws away his

shield, or by reason of ill-temper he uses abusive language, or

by reason of stinginess does not give a friend pecuniary

assistance; but whenever he does a grasping action, it is often

in the way of none of these vices, certainly not in all of them,

still in the way of some vice or other (for we blame him), and in

the way of Injustice.